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4.1  Introduction and Summary 
Most standard analyses of the effects of changing conditions of interna- 
tional trade and of international trade policies such as tariffs and import 
quotas either focus on conditions of  long-run equilibrium or implicitly 
assume that  resources  can be moved costlessly from one activity to 
another. Recent experience with the problems of  adjusting to the in- 
crease in the world price of energy, to cite one dramatic instance, demon- 
strates that this practice of  abstracting from the process of  adjustment 
ignores many important  questions of  international trade policy. The 
purpose of this paper is to examine some of these questions in the context 
of  a modified version of the standard two-sector model and, specifically, 
to analyze the interaction of various government policies with the adjust- 
ment process.’ 
The model of  adjustment technology, as set forth in section 4.2, is 
obtained  from  the  standard  Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model  by 
assuming that the process of moving capital from one industry to another 
requires an input of  some of the economy’s  available labor. This assump- 
tion gives rise to a distinction between short-run production possibilities, 
with a fmed distribution of  capital, and long-run production possibilities, 
when capital is mobile. It also implies an explicit cost for capital move- 
ment in terms of reduced production of final outputs. Recognition of this 
cost implies that the adjustment process cannot be viewed as governed by 
an arbitrarily specified “speed of  adjustment” that should be made as 
large as possible. Rather, the adjustment process must be treated as an 
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economic process in which the marginal cost of more rapid adjustment is 
balanced against its marginal benefit. 
In section 4.3, the optimal adjustment path of the economy is analyzed 
under the assumption that the economy is managed by a planner who 
maximizes the present discounted value of the economy’s final output. 
This analysis  establishes the central point that decisions about adjustment 
are fundamentally investment decisions in which the marginal benefit of 
capital movement reflects the present discounted value of the differential 
between the rental earned by capital in the two industries. 
The main point of  section 4.4 is that private maximizing behavior will 
lead to a socially efficient adjustment path provided that three conditions 
are met. First, there must be no distortions in the product or factor 
markets that cause privately perceived values to diverge from true social 
values. Second, the private discount rate used in calculating the benefit of 
capital movement to private capital owners must be the same as the social 
discount rate. Third, the expectations on which private capital owners 
base their estimates of  the benefits of  capital movement must be “ra- 
tional” in the sense that they appropriately reflect the structure of  the 
economy. 
As discussed in section 4.5, when there are distortions that directly 
affect the adjustment process, then, in accord with the general principles 
of policy intervention, it is appropriate for the government to intervene 
to countervail these distortions. In particular, a proportional tax on factor 
income (which is nondistorting in a static context) distorts the adjustment 
process by reducing the privately perceived benefit of  capital movement 
relative to the true social benefit. To countervail this distortion it is 
appropriate to grant an investment tax credit for all adjustment costs. An 
excess of  the private discount rate over the social discount rate also 
reduces the privately perceived benefit of  capital movement relative to 
the true social benefit, and requires either a subsidy to capital movement 
or a subsidy to the income of capital in the expanding industry. Errors of 
expectations by private capital owners also distort the adjustment pro- 
cess.  However, except  in  the case where  such errors arise from  an 
incorrect perception of  future government policy, there is no general 
argument that government policy can be used systematically to correct 
distortions resulting from errors of  expectations. 
When  a country can  affect the price that  it pays for imports,  the 
first-best policy for that country requires that the government impose an 
optimum tariff to make the privately perceived price of imports equal to 
the social marginal cost of  imports. As discussed in section 4.6, the 
adjustment process influences optimal tariff policy. Specifically, under 
fairly general conditions, the optimal tariff (measured as a specific tariff) 
declines as the economy moves along its optimal adjustment path, start- 
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ment path, the optimal tariff is greater than the tariff  that would be 
charged with a fixed distribution of  capital because the process of capital 
movement increases the marginal cost of  domestically produced import 
substitutes. To achieve the optimal adjustment path, it is not necessary 
for the government to intervene in the adjustment process to promote the 
movement of resources into the import-competing industry. This reflects 
the general principle that no intervention in the adjustment process is 
required provided that the first-best policy that countervails a product or 
factor market distortion is implemented. 
When the first-best  policy is not available, the second-best combination 
of  policies may or may not require intervention in the adjustment pro- 
cess. This general principle is illustrated in section 4.7 by  considering 
second-best policies to exploit monopoly power in trade when the first- 
best policy of  an optimally varying tariff is not available. If  a constant 
tariff that yields the optimal steady state is imposed, the speed of  con- 
vergence toward this steady state (starting from free trade) is less than 
socially optimal. It is appropriate therefore for the government to inter- 
vene in the adjustment process by subsidizing the movement of  capital 
into the import-competing industry. In contrast, if  the government im- 
poses the optimal steady state import quota, the speed of  convergence 
toward the steady state is greater than socially optimal; and it is appropri- 
ate to tax the movement of capital into the import-competing industry. If 
the government can employ a production subsidy but  not a tariff, an 
import quota, or a consumption tax, the optimal second-best policy is an 
optimally varying production subsidy, with no intervention in the adjust- 
ment process. If  the government can employ a consumption tax but not a 
tariff, an import quota, or a production subsidy, the optimal second-best 
policy includes not only the consumption tax but also intervention in the 
adjustment process in order to restrain the movement of capital out of the 
import-competing industry. This difference between the consumption tax 
and the production subsidy reflects the fact that under the production 
subsidy (but not under the consumption tax) the price facing domestic 
producers of  the import substitute corresponds to the social marginal 
value of domestically produced import substitutes. Under the production 
subsidy, therefore, private capital owners receive the correct signal con- 
cerning the benefits and costs of capital movement, without any govern- 
ment intervention in the adjustment process. 
The concluding section of  the paper considers extensions and gener- 
alizations of the analysis in the preceding sections. First, we examine the 
effects of government policies directed at the adjustment process on the 
distribution of  income among factor owners and the possible effects on 
the adjustment process of  government policies directed at affecting the 
distribution of  income. Next, we investigate the implications of  a more 
general adjustment technology that allows for investment in altering the 76  Michael Mussa 
size of the capital stock, as well as in moving capital from one industry to 
another. Finally, we summarize the general principles concerning gov- 
ernment policy toward the adjustment process that are implied by  the 
present theoretical analysis and that appear likely to carry over to more 
elaborate and realistic models. 
4.2  A Model of Adjustment Technology 
To provide a formal basis for the analysis of  the role of  government 
policy in the adjustment process, it is useful to develop a simple model of 
adjustment technology, based on the standard two-sector model.’ Sup- 
pose that the output of each good is produced in accord with a neoclassi- 
cal, linear homogeneous production function: 
(1)  x  = F(Lx,  KX), 
(2)  z  = G(L,,Kz), 
where Lx,  L,,  K,,  and K, are the quantities of labor and capital used in 
the respective industries. Let Z be the numeraire commodity, and let P, 
W,  R,,  and R, denote, respectively, the price of X, the wage of  labor, 
and the rental rates on capital in Xand capital in Z,  all measured in terms 
of 2.  The total stock of  capital, K = Kx  + Kz, is fixed. Its distribution 
between Xand  Z is indicated by the variable K,  with Kx = K and Kz = & 
-  K. At any moment of time, K is given, but it can be changed over by a 
process that uses some of  the economy’s supply of  labor; specifically, 
suppose that 
(3)  L1= p?, 
where Z  = lkl is the rate at which capital is being moved from X to Z or 
vice versa. Labor is freely mobile, but total labor use is constrained by the 
fixed aggregate supply: 
(4)  L,+  L,+  L,=L. 
From this specification of productive technology, we obtain the trans- 
formation function 
(5)  z  = T(X,I,K), 
which indicates the maximum amount of  Z that can be produced as a 
function of X,.Z, and K.  Without going into details or derivations, we may 
summarize the key properties of this transformation function, using the 
notation  and ?;I to denote the first and second partial derivatives of  T. 
First, the marginal cost of X in terms of  Z is given by -  Tx  and is equal to 
the ratio of  the marginal products of  labor in 2 and X: 
(6)  -  Tx(X,Z,K) = MPLZMPL,. 77  Government Policy and the Adjustment Process 
The marginal cost of  X  is an increasing function of X (- Txx>O), an 
increasing function of  Z  (- TxI>O), and  a decreasing function of  K 
( -  TXK  <  0). Second, the marginal cost of Z in terms of 2  is given by -  TI 
and satisfies 
(7)  -T,(X,Z,K)  = p.Z*MPLZ. 
The marginal cost of  Z is zero for I = 0 and is greater than zero for Z >  0; it 
is an increasing function of  Z (- GI >  0) and an increasing function of X 
(- I;x  > 0). If  X  is relatively capital-intensive, then -  TIK < 0; and 
conversely if Xis relatively labor-intensive. Third, a shift of  capital from 
2 to X increases potential output of 2,  given X and Z,  if  and only if  the 
value  of  the marginal product  of  capital in X  (measured  by  Rx  = 
-  Tx.MPKx)  is greater than the value of the marginal product of capital 
in 2 (measured by RZ = MPKZ);  specifically, 
(8)  TK(X,  Z,  K)  = -  Tx.  MPKx -  MPKz = Rx -  RZ. 
For each feasible combination of  X and Z, there is a K*(X,Z)  such that 
TK(X,Z,K)zO  according as KsK*(X,Z),  <  > 
where Kg>O  and K,*<O.  Further,  TKx =  TXK  < 0,  TKI  =  TIK  S  0 
depending on relative factor intensities, and  TKK  < 0 at least in the 
neighborhood of  points where TK  = 0. 
Some of the properties of the transformation function are illustrated in 
figure 4.1.  In the upper panel, the transformation curves T(X,  0, KO)  and 
T(X,  0, K,)  show the effect of  a redistribution of  capital (K,  > KO)  on 
production possibilities, after the process of  capital movement is com- 
plete. The marginal cost curves -  Tx(X,  0, KO)  and -  Tx(X,  0, K,) in the 
lower panel show the effect of this capital redistribution on the marginal 
cost of  producing X.  The transformation  curve T(X,  Zo,  KO)  and the 
associated marginal cost curve  -Tx(X, lo,  KO)  show the effect of  a 
positive rate of capital movement (lo  >  0) on production possibilities for 
final outputs and on the marginal cost of  X. 
The outer envelope of all of the transformation curves T(X,  0, K)  is the 
transformation curve T*  (X)  implied by the standard two-sector model in 
which labor and capital are both freely mobile between X and 2. For- 
mally, this “long-run’’ transformation curve is defined by 
(9)  2 = T(X)=  T(X,O,K*(X,O)). 
Corresponding to this long-run transformation curve, in the lower panel 
of figure 4.1,  is the long-run marginal cost curve -  Tx(X).  This long-run 
marginal cost curve is flatter than any of  the short-run marginal cost 
curves  -Tx(X, 0, K)  drawn for  a fixed distribution  of  capital. The 
intersection of the long-run marginal cost curve with each of  these short- 78  Michael Mum 
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Fig. 4.1  Transformation curves and marginal cost curves for different 
distributions of  capital and  different rates of capital move- 
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run marginal cost curves occurs at the level of Xfor which K = K*  (X,  0). 
At the corresponding point in the upper panel of  figure 4.1, the trans- 
formation curve T(X,  0, K)  is tangent to the outer envelope transforma- 
tion curve T(X).  At such points, TK(X,  0, K)  = 0, indicating that it is not 
possible to increase output of  Z  through any redistribution of  capital 
without reducing output of  X. 
4.3  Social Optimization 
Suppose that the economy whose technology was described in the 
preceding section is a small country that faces a fixed relative price of Xin 
world trade, P,  and a fixed world interest rate, r. The relevant objective 
for a social planner (leaving aside issues of  income distribution) is to 
maximize 
(10)  lrn(p.x+  Z)  exp (-r-t)cit 
subject to the constraint 
(11)  2 = T(X,  Ikl,K) 
starting from an initial distribution of  capital, KO. 
Hamiltonian 
To determine the solution of  this problem, define the current value 
(12)  H = P .  x + z + 8. (  T(X,  iki ,  K)  -  Z)  +  A. k, 
where 8 is a Lagrangian multiplier assigned to the constraint (11) and A is 
the costate variable that represents the shadow price of  a unit of  capital 
located in X rather than Z.  Assuming an interior solution, the optimum 





aHIaX =  P + 0  Tx = 0, 
aHlaz = 1 -  0 = 0, 
aa/ak = sign (k).  0  a  T~  + A = 0, 
(16) 
The optimum path must also be consistent with the constraint (ll), the 
initial condition, K(0) = KO,  and the boundary conditions 
(17) 
(18)  ArOif K=O. 
The conditions (13), (14), and (15) jointly determine output of X and 
the rate of capital movement, Z = IKI, by the requirement that the mar- 
A = r.A -  0.TK. 
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ginal cost of  X, -  T,(X,  I,  K),  equal P, and the requirement that the 
marginal cost of  capital movement,  -T,(X, I, K),  equal  IAl.  These 
requirements implicitly determine X  and I as functions of  K, IAI,  and P: 
(19)  x=X(K,Ihl,P),  x,>o,  X,,,<O,  Xp>o, 
(20)  I=F(K,IhI,P),  7~20,  FIA~>O,  Fp>o. 
Output of  2 is determined by the constraint (11) to be 
(21)  Z = Z (K,  IAl,P) = T(x((K,  lAl,P),7(K,  IAI,P),K). 
The direction of  capital movement is determined by  the sign of  A: 
(22)  ~=~~~~(A).~(K,IAI,P). 
Further, since -  T,(X,  I,  K)  = 0 if  and only if  I =  0, it follows that 
(23) 
Given these results, the determination of  the optimal path of  the econ- 
omy reduces to determining the optimal paths of  K and A.  This may be 
accomplished with the aid of  figure 4.2. From (23) it follows that the K 
axis (where A = 0) corresponds to the combinations of  K and A for which 




(25)  q(K,IAl,P) = TK(X(K,IAI,P),l(K,IAl,P),K). 
Thus >;  = 0 along the line where A = cp (K,  IN, P)h.  Above this line, >; > 
0, and below it, >; < 0. The >;  = 0 line intersects the K axis at the steady 
state distribution of  capital, K  (P),  which is the efficient distribution of 
capital determined in the standard two-sector model where labor and 
capital are both freely mobile. At the steady state distribution of  capital, 
the short-run marginal cost  of  producing the steady state output 2, 
-  T,(X,  0, K(P)),  is equal to the long-run marginal cost of  producing 
this level of output, -  Fx (x);  and both short-run and long-run marginal 
cost are equal to the given output price, P.4 
From the dynamic system illustrated in figure 4.2,  it is possible to 
determine the paths of K and A,  starting from any initial combination of K 
and A. For each initial K,  however, there is only one initial A for which the 
subsequent path of  K and A converges to the steady state where K  = 
K  (P)  and A = 0. This is the value of  A that lies along the stable branch of 
the dynamic system illustrated in figure 4.2, which is denoted by  x(K). 
For any initial K, a choice of  an initial A not equal to x(K) leads to a 
subsequent path of  K and A that ultimately violates one of  the boundary 
K = o iff  A = 0. 
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Fig. 4.2  The optimal adjustment path for the distribution of capital and 
the shadow price for relocating capital. 
conditions (17) or (18). Such paths are clearly not optimal since it is 
obviously senseless to devote productive resources to moving more capi- 
tal into the industry that already has all of  the capital and out of  the 
industry that has none. Thus the optimal path of  K and  A  is the path 
associated with the stable branch, and this path of  K and A determines the 
optimal paths for all other variables. 82  Michael Mussa 
Finally, from the solution of  the differential equation (24), it follows 
that 
X(t)  =  cp(~(s),k(s)I,~)  exp (-r.(s-tt))h,  r 
(26) 
where X(s) and K(s)  are the values of  A and K on the optimum path at 
times. This result expresses the fact that the appropriate shadow price for 
moving a unit of  capital from Z to X is equal to the present discounted 
value of difference between the rental earned by a unit of capital located 
in X and the rental earned by a unit of  capital located in 2.  This result is 
important because it reveals that decisions about adjustment  are not 
ordinary, static production decisions that involve comparisons of current 
costs with current benefits, but are fundamentally investment decisions 
that require the balancing of  current costs with the present discounted 
value of  future benefits. Specifically, in the present analysis, the optimal 
rate of  capital movement is not determined simply by  comparing the 
current rental differential between capital located in X  and capital lo- 
cated in 2  with the current cost of  capital movement. Rather, determina- 
tion of  the optimal rate of capital movement requires that the planner 
recognize how this rental differential will change as the economy moves 
along its optimal path in order to establish the appropriate shadow price 
for moving a unit of  capital from one industry to the other. 
4.4  Private Maximization 
Next, consider how  the economic system would  behave if  it were 
governed by the decisions of individual maximizing agents rather than by 
a social planner.  Since labor is mobile between the three production 
activities, maximization by  individual workers implies that wage rates 
must be the same for labor used in X,  in Z,  and in capital movement. 
Maximization by private capital owners implies that labor in each indus- 
try will  be employed up to the point where the value of  its marginal 
product (Pa MPLx(tx) for X  and MPLz(tz) for Z)  is equal to the wage 
rate, W. These conditions determine the labodcapital ratios in each 
industry, tx(W/P)  and tz(W),  as functions of  W and P. These labor/ 
capital ratios, in turn, determine the marginal product of capital in each 
industry, MPKx(tx)  and MPKZ(tz), and hence the rental rates earned 
by a unit of  capital in each industry, Rx(W,  P)  = P  MPK,(t,(W/P)) 
and R,(W)  =  MPKz(tz(W)).  The  service of  capital  movement  is 
assumed to be provided on a competitive basis by profit maximizing firms 
that equate the marginal cost of providing this service, W  (dLJdZ),  to 
the price, q,  that they receive for a unit of this service.’ This assumption, 
together with the specification of  labor requirements for capital move- 
ment given in (3), implies that the demand for labor for use in capital 
movement is given by LI(W,q)  = (l/p).(q/2W)*. 83  Government Policy and the Adjustment Process 
In order for the economy to be in equilibrium when its behavior is 
governed by  the decisions of  individual maximizing agents, the total 
demand for labor must equal the available supply; that is, 
(27)  e,(w/P)x+  e,(w).(K- K)  + LI(w,q)  = b. 
This condition determines the equilibrium wage rate as a function of K, q, 
and P: 
w  = w (K,  q,  P)  awiaK2  0,  awiaq >  0, awiap> 0. 
(28)  < 
It is important to note that this formula for the equilibrium wage rate is 
also the formula that determines the wage rate for the social planner, with 
q = Ihl . This must be so because the social planner equates the value of 
the marginal product  of  labor in  all production activities and is con- 
strained by  the total labor supply. It follows that with q = Ihl, private 
maximization results in the same allocation of labor as determined by the 
social planner. Hence outputs of X and Z and the rate of  capital move- 
ment under private maximization are determined precisely by the func- 
tions X(K,q,P),  Z(K,  q,  P),  and F(K,  q,  P)  that were derived in the 
analysis of  the behavior of  the social planner. 
It is apparent that the critical issue in determining the behavior of  the 
economy under private maximization is the determination of  the price 
that private capital owners will pay for capital movement. The benefit 
that a private capital owner believes he would enjoy from moving a unit 
of capital from Xto  Z, denoted by p  (t), is the present discounted value of 
the expected difference between the rental rate on capital in X and the 
rental rate on capital in Z; that is, 
p(t) = J,  (R$(s;t) -  Rg(s;t))exp(-  i-(s  -  t))ds, 
where R$(s;t)  and RS(s;t) are the expected time paths of the rental rates 
on capital in X and 2,  based on expectations held at time t, and i is the 
discount rate used  by  private  capital owners.  The price that capital 
owners will pay for capital movement is 1p1 . The sign of p  determines the 
direction of  capital movement, in accord with 
(30) 
Further, differentiation of (29) with respect to t, given the expected time 
paths of Rx  and RZ, implies that 
k = sign(p) 1  (K,  lpl,  P). 
(31)  p=i*p-q(K,Ipl,P). 
This expresses the requirement that the total expected rate of return from 
holding capital in X rather than Z, including expected capital gains, 
(Rx -  RZ + $)lp,  must equal the private discount rate, i. 84  Michael Mussa 
Different assumptions about expectations yield different conclusions 
about the behavior of  p. If  expectations are “static” in the sense that the 
current economic situation is expected to persist indefinitely, then g  = 0 
and hence p is determined by 
(32)  p=  cp(K,Ipl,P)li. 
If  i = r, then the path of  p determined by (32) is shown by the A =  cp (K, 
IAl, P)lr  line in figure 4.2. It follows that the steady state distribution of 
capital is the same K(P)  determined  by  the social planner, but  that 
convergence to this steady state under private maximization with static 
expectations is more rapid than is socially optimal. Further, for any i,  the 
steady state distribution of  capital is K(P).  The greater the value of  i 
relative to r, the slower is the speed of  convergence toward this steady 
state. Thus, up to a point, a high private discount rate tends to offset the 
distortion created by static expectations. 
The social planner does not make the mistake of believing that current 
conditions will persist  indefinitely  because he calculates the effect  of 
future capital movement on the value of  A.  If private agents had the same 
correctness of  foresight, their expectations would be “rational,” in the 
sense that they would appropriately reflect the structure of the economic 
system. With rational expectations, we require that I;.”  = I;.. Hence, if i = 
r and expectations are rational, the conditions that determine the evolu- 
tion  of  p and K  must  be precisely  the same  as the conditions  that 
determine the evolution of  A and K for the social planner, as represented 
in figure 4.2. In addition, for expectations to be rational, they must be 
consistent with the boundary conditions (17) and (18). 
Specifically, when all capital is removed from X and K  = 0, capital 
owners should not expect that resources will continue to be devoted to 
the futile task of  moving more capital into Z;  and, conversely, when K = 
K. This implies that the only path of  p and K that is consistent with 
rational expectations is the path that corresponds to the stable branch in 
figure 4.2  namely, the socially optimal path that maximizes the present 
discounted value of  the economy’s final output. 
This key result may be summarized in the form of a general proposi- 
tion: 
Private maximizing behavior will lead to a socially efJicient adjust- 
mentprocess  provided that the  prices of outputs and  factors and the 
discount rate perceived by private agents correspond to their true 
social  values, and provided  that the expectations that influence 
private decisions about adjustment are rational. 
This proposition has been established in the context of a specific model 
of adjustment  technology,  under  the restrictive  assumption  that  the 
prices of  outputs and the discount rate are exogenously given and con- 
(Pl) 85  Government Policy and the Adjustment Process 
stant. It is clear, however,  that the procedure used  to establish this 
proposition  in the present narrow context carries over to alternative 
specifications of  productive technology, provided that the technology 
does not involve externalities or scale economies that would cause prices 
perceived  by  private  agents to diverge from true social values. The 
assumption of  constant output prices and a constant discount rate can 
easily be relaxed to any time paths of prices and the discount rate that are 
exogenously given to the production sector of  the economy.6 
4.5  Distortions of the Adjustment Process 
The general theory of  policy intervention suggests that government 
policies to improve the efficiency of  the adjustment process should be 
directed to correcting distortions that induce the privately perceived costs 
or benefits of adjustment to diverge from the true social costs or benefits. 
It is relevant to consider the circumstances that give rise to such distor- 
tions and the policies that are appropriate to deal with them. 
One important example is the distortion arising from a proportional tax 
on income from capital or on all factor income. Since total factor supplies 
have been assumed fixed, such a tax is nondistorting in the standard static 
production model, with either fixed or freely mobile capital. Such a tax, 
however, distorts the adjustment process because it causes the privately 
perceived benefit of capital movement to be lower than the social benefit. 
It T is the proportional tax rate, then the privately perceived benefit of 
owning a unit of  capital in X rather than 2 is given by 
(33)  b = (1 -  T)  ' p, 
where p  is defined in (29) as the present discounted value of the expected 
before-tax difference between the rental on capital in Xand the rental on 
capital in 2.  If  private capital owners have rational expectations and the 
private discount rate is equal to the social discount rate, then the adjust- 
ment path toward the steady state is as illustrated in figure 4.3. The K axis 
is still the line along which K = 0. But the line along which 6 = 0 is now 
determined by the condition 
(34)  b = (1 -  ~)*cp(K,Ibl,P)/r 
rather than by the condition b = p = q(K,  lpl, P)h.  The steady state 
distribution of capital, Z?  (P),  is the same as in figure 4.2, but the path of 
convergence to this steady state in figure 4.3  involves a less than socially 
optimal rate of  capital movement. 
Elimination of  the tax on income from capital would, of  course, re- 
move this distortion of  the adjustment process. Other considerations of 
government policy, such as the need for revenue, however, may make the 
elimination of  this tax impractical. An alternative policy would be to 86  Michael Mussa 
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Fig. 4.3  The adjustment  path when a tax is imposed on  the income from 
capital. 
remove the distortionary effect of the tax on the adjustment process by 
allowing an investment tax credit which permits the deduction of  adjust- 
ment costs from taxable income. The value of  this credit is the price paid 
for a unit of capital movement, q,  multiplied by the tax rate, T.  With this 
credit, the total privately perceived benefit of moving capital from 2  to  X 
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(35)  b=(l-T)*cp+T*b. 
It follows immediately that b = )I.  This establishes the proposition 
To correct the distortion of  the adjustment process created by  a 
proportional tax on income from capital (or all factor income) it is 
appropriate to grant an investment tax credit that allows the deduc- 
tion of  all adjustment costs. 
The general argument for this investment tax credit is essentially the 
argument for a consumption-based expenditure tax, rather than an in- 
come tax. An income tax distorts intertemporal choices because of  the 
double taxation of savings. An investment tax credit that allows income 
used for productive investment to avoid taxation removes this distortion. 
A second possible cause of  distortion of  the adjustment process is an 
excess of  the private discount rate, i, over the social discount rate, r.’ 
From the analysis in sections 4.3  and 4.4,  it is clear that an excess of i over 
r reduces the privately perceived benefit of capital movement relative to 
the true social benefit. Like a tax on income from capital, an excess of  i 
over r does not affect the steady state distribution of  capital, but it does 
reduce the rate of  convergence toward this steady state to less than the 
socially optimal rate. 
One policy that would correct this distortion would be to eliminate 
whatever is responsible for the excess of i over r. If  this is not possible, an 
alternative policy would be to subsidize capital owners in the industry 
where capital earns a higher rental or tax capital owners in the industry 
where capital earns a lower rental. The required subsidy is equal to the 
difference i -  r multiplied by the privately perceived benefit of  owning 
capital in the high-rent industry. Assuming that owners of capital in Xare 
either subsidized or taxed (whichever is appropriate), the privately per- 
ceived benefit of  owning capital in X  rather than 2 becomes 
(p2) 
(36)  (cp(s)  + (i -  r).b(s))exp( -i.(s -  t))ds. 
Assuming rational expectations, differentiation of (36) with respect to t 
yields 
(37) 
Thus, with the income subsidy for owners of  capital in the high-rent 
industry and with rational expectations, the differential equation that 
determines the evolution of b is the same as the differential equation that 
determines the evolution of  A for the social planner. It follows that with 
the subsidy and with rational expectations, the adjustment path of  the 
economy under private maximization will be socially optimal. 
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It is difficult to conceive, however, of a government that would system- 
atically subsidize capital owners who already earn high rental rates or 
systematically tax those who earn low rental rates. An alternative and 
probably more attractive policy would be to subsidize the movement of 
capital out of the low-rent industry. From (36) it follows that the required 
subsidy to capital movement is given by 
(38)  (i -  r) Ih (s)  I exp ( -  i .  (s -  t)  )  ds, 
where the path of  h(s) is determined by  the stable branch in figure 4.2. 
The required subsidy is approximately proportional to the price of capital 
movement, q (t);  specifically, 
(39)  o(t)=((i-r)l(i+E)).q(t), 
where E is the speed of convergence of q toward its steady state value of 
zero. This establishes the proposition 
To correct the distortion of  the adjustment process created by an 
excess of  the private discount rate over the social discount rate, it is 
appropriate to subsidize the movement of  capital at a rate that is 
approximately proportional to the cost of  capital movement, using 
a subsidy rate that is itself approximately proportional to the differ- 
ence between the private and social discount rates. 
The specific result for the appropriate subsidy rate given in (39) de- 
pends on the details of  the present model of  the adjustment process. 
More generally, it can be argued that an excess of  i over r discourages all 
forms of investment and hence makes a general subsidy to all forms of 
investment a desirable policy. 
Errors of expectations are a third potentially important cause of  distor- 
tions  of  the  adjustment process.  For  example, the  analysis of  static 
expectations in the discussion of  private maximizing behavior demon- 
strated that this particular deviation from rationality causes the benefits 
of  capital movement to be overvalued and hence results in too rapid 
convergence of the distribution of  capital to its steady state distribution. 
To  correct this  distortion  (assuming that  expectations  could  not  be 
altered) would require the imposition of  a tax on capital movement. 
Other errors of expectations that cause the benefits of capital movement 
to be undervalued by private capital owners would justify a reverse policy 
of  subsidizing capital movement. 
In general, however, it is difficult to argue that errors of  expectations 
would lead systematically to either overvaluation or undervaluation of 
the benefits of capital movement. The only general circumstance in which 
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intervention may be required to correct errors of expectations is when 
such errors are intrinsically related to other government policies. For 
instance, if a government intends to provide temporary assistance to an 
industry injured by import competition, it should adopt policies to ensure 
that such assistance does not lead to increased investment in the dis- 
tressed industry. Otherwise, the assistance that is granted may strengthen 
political pressures to make such assistance permanent rather than tem- 
porary. Indeed, the expectation that even temporary assistance may be 
granted to industries adversely affected by import competition may dis- 
tort the adjustment process by inducing owners of  factors in such indus- 
tries to delay adjustment in the hope that protective measures may make 
adjustment unnecessary. Thus the social cost of  measures to protect 
particular industries from import competition is not limited to the indus- 
tries in which such measures  are adopted, but  also extends to other 
industries where adjustment is influenced by the expectation that such 
measures may be adopted. 
Finally, the adjustment process may be afflicted by the usual problems 
of  externalities, monopoly and monopsony power, and taxes and sub- 
sidies that distort the economic system in general. In fact, the adjustment 
process may be more exposed to such afflictions than other economic 
activities. Social insurance programs that provide benefits on the basis of 
previous experience in a particular industry or region (whatever their 
social value) tend to limit the incentive for adjustment by  those who 
would lose benefit entitlements as a result of  moving to other industries or 
regions. Special privileges granted to existing producers in a particular 
industry  or region,  such as  preferential access to lower cost  energy 
sources or freedom from certain zoning or environmental restrictions, 
provide an artificial incentive for inefficient but established producers to 
remain  in  an industry  or region  and  an artificial impediment to the 
establishment of  new an more efficient producers. Legal restrictions on 
plant closings such as have been proposed in many states limit both the 
outward movement of resources from declining activities and the willing- 
ness to invest in new areas. In general, the political opposition to eco- 
nomic change and the measures to which it gives rise tend to reduce the 
speed of  adjustment and to distort the adjustment process. 
4.6  Adjustment to an Optimum Tariff 
The adjustment process must be taken into account not only in design- 
ing policies to correct distortions of  that process, but also in adopting 
policies to serve other objectives.  A specific example of  this general 
problem that illustrates many important principles is the imposition of an 
optimum tariff by a country that desires to exploit its monopoly power in 
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The relevant objective for a social planner who recognizes that the 
marginal cost of  imports rises as the volume of  imports rises is to maxi- 
mize 
(40) 
subject to the constraints 
(41)  Z=  T(X,IkI,K), 
~-(O(C)  + B) exp (-r.t)dt 
(42)  Z- B=J(C-X),J(O)=O,J’>O,  J”>O, 
where C measures home consumption of X,  B measures home consump- 
tion of 2,  and the foreign offer function, J,  indicates the volume of home 
exports, Z -  B,  required to pay for home imports, C -  X. For simplicity, 
it is assumed that the social discount rate is constant and that the marginal 
utility of  consumption of  Z is constant and equal to unity. The initial 
distribution of capital, KO,  is assumed to be the steady state distribution 
appropriate to free trade. 
To  determine the solution of  the planner’s optimization problem, 
define the current value Hamiltonian 
(43)  H=  U(C)+B+8*(T(X71KI,K)-Z) 
+ a.  (J(C -  X) -  (z  -  B)) + xk, 
where 8 and A retain their previous interpretations and a  is a Lagrangian 
multiplier assigned to the offer function constraint. In addition to the 
initial condition K(0)  = KO,  the boundary conditions (17) and (18), and 
the constraints (41) and (42), the optimum path of  the economy must 




(47)  aHiaz= -e-a=o, 
(48)  aHlak=sign (k).e.T,+A=O, 
(49)  h = r.A -  8-  TK. 
To interpret the conditions (44) through (48), it is useful to think of the 
planner as establishing a relative price P for a unit of Xin terms of 2.  The 
planner sets C so that the marginal utility of consumption of X,  U‘  (C), is 
equal to P, thus determining C as a function of  P: 
aHlaC = u + a.~’  = 0, 
aHIaB = 1 + a  = 0, 
aH/ax=  8-  Tx -  a.~’  = 0, 
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The planner sets imports of X  so that their marginal cost, J’  (C  -  X),  is 
equal to P, thus determining 
(51)  C-X=  J’-’  (P). 
The planner determines X and I = lkl so that the marginal cost of X,  - 
Tx(X, I, K), is equal to P and the marginal cost of I, - &(X,  I,  K),  is 
equal to  IAl. These conditions jointly determine X  and I through the 
functionsR(K,  IAI, P)  and l(X,  1x1, P)  introduced in section 4.2, with 2 
given by  Z(K,  IAl, P). The value of  P that is set by  the planner must 
satisfy the condition 
(52)  U’-’(P)  -  J’-l(P)  =X(K,IAI,P). 
This condition implicitly determines P as a function of  K and IN: 
(53)  P = P(K,  iAi),aSiaK<o,aPiax>o. 
This result, in turn, determines C,  C  -  X,  X,  I,  2,  and B = 2 -  J(X -  C) 
as functions of  K and 1x1. 
The paths of  K and A  may be determined with the aid of  the phase 
diagram shown in figure 4.4. The rate of capital movement from 2  to Xis 
determined by 
(54) 
This rule is slightly different from the rule (22) that determines kin  figure 
4.2 because P is no longer tixed; but it is still true that K = 0 along the K 
axis, is positive above the K axis, and is negative below the K axis. The 
evolution of  A is determined by 
k = sign(A).r(K, lAl,p(K, Ihl)). 
(55)  >;  = r*A -  +(K,  IAI), 
where 
(56) 
The line along which x  = 0 is determined by  the condition  A  = +(K, 
IAI)/r, which is similar to the condition that determines the >;  = 0 line in 
figure 4.2, except that Pis  no longer fixed. The steady state distribution of 
capital, K,  is the unique value of  K for which +(K,  0) = 0. The relative 
output price that is associated with K is  = p(E,  0). This capital stock 
distribution and relative output price are precisely the same as would be 
obtained in the standard static analysis of the optimum tariff, under the 
assumption that capital is freely mobile between industries. The path of 
convergence to this steady state is along the stable branch of the dynamic 
system determined by  (54) and (559, as illustrated by the function i(K) 
shown in figure 4.4.  Specifically, starting from KO <  (because the 
amount of  capital allocated to X under free trade is less than under the 
+(K,  1x1) = q(K,  IAl,p(K, 1x1)). 92  Michael Mussa 
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Fig. 4.4  The adjustment path under an optimally varying tariff, 
optimum tariff), we move down the i  (K)  line in figure 4.4  until we reach 
the steady state position where K  = R and A  = i(K) = 0.8 
If  private capital owners have rational  expectations and  the  same 
discount rate as the social planner, and if  there are no other distortions, 
the optimum  path  of  the economy can  be  obtained  by  imposing an 
optimum tariff that varies with the distribution of  capital. Stated as a 93  Government Policy and the Adjustment Process 
specific tariff of  T units of 2  per unit of X,  the required tariff rate is given 
by 
(57)  T(K) = P(K,Ifi(K)I)  -P*(K,lfi(K)l), 
where P*  (K,  I);(K) I ) is the relative price of Xfacing foreign suppliers of 
home imports, as determined by 
(58)  P* =  J(C -  X)/(C  -  X), 
whereX = z(K,  Ifi(K)I,P(K, Ifi(K)I))andC = U'-'(P(K,  Ifi(K)I)). 
When  this tariff  is  imposed, the privately perceived cost  of  imports 
becomes P* + 7 (K).  The requirement of  equilibrium in the market for 
X,  as expressed  by  the condition  (52), ensures that  the equilibrium 
relative price of  X facing domestic producers and consumers is given by 
P  (K,  Ifi (K)I),  provided that private capital owners have rational ex- 
pectations and hence assign the same value to capital movement as the 
social planner. 
The optimum tariff at the steady state position of  the economy, 7  (K), 
is the same as the optimum tariff calculated in the standard static trade 
model; it is the tariff that equates the privately perceived cost of imports, 
P* + 7,  to their social marginal cost,  J' (C -  X),  and to  both the marginal 
utility of  X  consumption, -  U' (C), and the long-run marginal cost of 
domesticXproduction, -  Tx  (X).  The optimum steady state tariff T (K) 
and the associated steady state position of the economy are the same as 
those obtained in the standard two-sector model in which  labor  and 
capital are both freely mobile. 
The importance of the adjustment process for optimum tariff policy is 
indicated by the variation in 7  (K);  spe~ifically,~ 
As K  rises  toward K,  imports declines  and, provided  that  the 
(P4)  difference between the marginal  and  average cost of  imports in- 
creases with increases in imports, 7  (K)  declines. 
This proposition may be established with the aid of  figure 4.5.  In the 
left-hand  panel,  the curve labeled  U'  (C) indicates the demand  for 
consumption of  X  as a function of  the price, P, facing domestic con- 
sumers; the curve labeled J  (C -  X)  / (C -  X)  indicates the supply of 
imports of X as a function of the price, P*, received by foreign suppliers; 
and the curve labeled J' (C -  X)  indicates the marginal cost of imports of 
X.  Under the optimum tariff, imports are carried to the point where their 
marginal cost is equal to the price facing consumers. It follows that the 
optimum tariff required at any given level of  imports is equal to the 
vertical distance between the J'  (C -  X)  and the J  (C -  X)  / (C-  X) 
curves at that level of imports. By assumption, this distance increases as 
the level of imports increases. In the right-hand panel, the curve labeled 

































































































































































































Fig. 4.5  Determination of the optimum tariff for a given distribution of  capital. 95  Government Policy and the Adjustment Process 
of  P, under the assumption that imports are carried to the point where 
their marginal cost equals P. This D  (P)  curve is the horizontal difference 
between the U’ (C) and the J’ (C -  X)  curves in the left-hand panel. The 
curve labeled MC (X,  K,)  indicates the marginal cost of  domestically 
produced X,  given a distribution of capital K1,  between KO  and K >  KO, 
when I = Ikl  is set at its optimum value, 7 (K,,  li  (Kl)I, P (K,,  Ifi  (K,)  I)). 
The intersection of the MC (X,  K,)  curve and the D  (P)  curve determines 
the appropriate value of  P (which satisfies [52]) when the distribution of 
capital is K1.  Feeding this price into the left-hand panel, the intersection 
of this price line with the U’  (C)  curve determines domestic consumption 
of X,  and the intersecton with the J’ (C -  X)  curve determines imports of 
X.  The vertical distance between the  J’ (C -  X)  curve and the J (C -  X)  / 
(C -  X)  curve at this level of imports determines the optimum (specific) 
tariff 7 (K,)  that is appropriate for the given distribution of  capital. As K 
increases along the path of convergence to the optimum steady state, the 
MC (X,  13,) curve in the right-hand panel shifts downward and to the 
right both because the increase in K directly reduces the marginal cost of 
producing X ( -  TxK <  0) and because the reduction in resources devoted 
to capital movement (d?/dK <  0 for K <  @ reduces the marginal cost of 
producing X ( -  TxI  >  0). It follows that as K rises toward K,  the value of 
P determined in the right-hand panel declines. Hence, in the left-hand 
panel, the level of  imports declines and so does the optimum (specific) 
tariff  T (K). 
It is not possible to prove that T (K)  is a decreasing function of K for K 
greater than K  because as K declines toward K  along the optimal adjust- 
ment path a declining I and a declining K have opposite effects on the 
marginal cost of  producing X.  However, it is possible to show that 
For any K  + K,  the optimum (specifc) tariff T (K)  is greater than 
(P5)  the optimum (specifc) tariff that would be charged if  the distribu- 
tion of capital were held fixed. 
In particular, if  the distribution of  capital were fixed at K, < K and no 
resources were devoted to capital movement, the relevant marginal cost 
curve for domestically produced X  would be the curve -  Tx (X,  0, K,)  in 
the right-hand panel of  figure 4.5. The intersection of this marginal cost 
curve with the D  (P)  curve determines the appropriate value of P when 
the distribution of capital is fixed at K1.  This price is necessarily less than 
the price determined by the intersection of the MC (X,  Kl)  curve and the 
D  (P)  curve because a positive rate of  capital movement which draws 
resources out of  the production of final goods increases the marginal cost 
of producing X.  It follows that the optimum tariff when the distribution of 
capital is fixed at K1  is less than 7 (  K,).  The same argument applies for any 
K  #  K since a positive I  = Id1  always increases the marginal cost of 
producing X. 96  Michael Mussa 
These propositions concerning the influence of the adjustment process 
an optimum tariff policy remain valid under more general assumptions 
about the utility function and productive technology. If  consumers can 
borrow and lend at a world interest rate equal to their subjective discount 
rate, the amount spent on consumption will be a constant proportion of 
the consumer’s unchanging wealth. Regardless of the form of the flow of 
utility function, generally represented by V (C, B),  the demand curve for 
consumption of X,  shown by the curve in the left-hand panel of figure 4.5, 
will not shift over time. Hence the proofs of propositions (P4) and (P5) go 
through as before.’O If  consumers are restricted to spending only their 
current income (equal to the value of  domestic output, P  * X + 2,  plus 
the redistributed tariff proceeds, T  -  (C -  X)), the demand curve in the 
left-hand panel will shift over time unless, as previously assumed, V (C, 
B)  =  U (C) + B. This assumption (which implies that the marginal 
propensity to spend on Xis zero and the marginal propensity to spend on 
Z is one) can easily be relaxed. If  both X and 2 are normal, the demand 
curve will shift to the right as income grows along the adjustment path, 
implying a rightward shift of the D (P)  curve in the right-hand panel. This 
rightward shift of  the D  (P)  curve (at the previous equilibrium price), 
however, is smaller than the rightward shift of the MC (X,  K)  curve. The 
reason is that only a fraction of  the increase in the value of  X output 
(equal to the excess of  short-run marginal cost over long-run marginal 
cost, less the reduction in tariff revenue) corresponds to the increase in 
consumer income, and, since Xand 2  are both normal, only a fraction of 
this increase in income is spent on X.  It follows that P declines as we move 
along the path of convergence to the steady state (starting from KO  <  I?) 
and propositions (P4) and (P5) remain valid. Generalizing this argument, 
it is clear that these propositions remain valid provided that 2 is not 
strongly inferior. With respect to productive technology, the key features 
that are vital in establishing propositions (P4) and (P5) are that the shift 
of resources into X reduces the marginal cost of producing X ( -  TxK <  0) 
and that the process of  moving these resources increases the marginal 
cost of  producing X (- TxI > 0). The propositions concerning the be- 
havior of the optimum tariff along the economy’s  adjustment path should 
remain valid under alternative specifications of  productive technology 
that retain these two essential features. 
Finally, it is important to note a general proposition concerning gov- 
ernment intervention into the adjustment process: 
To correct the distortion due to a divergence between the privately 
perceived cost of imports and the social marginal cost, the govern- 
ment must impose an  optimum (specific) tariff 7 (K) that varies 
appropriately along  the economy’s adjustment path. Given this 
tariff) the government should not intervene in any other manner to 
affect the adjustment process. 
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This proposition  reflects the general principle that government policy 
should aim directly at distortions that impair the efficiency of  the eco- 
nomic system. The correct policy to deal with a divergence between the 
private and social cost of  imports is an optimum tariff which makes the 
privately perceived cost of  imports correspond to their true social mar- 
ginal cost. The appropriate tariff, T (K), reflects the nature of the adjust- 
ment process. However, once the optimum tariff has been adopted, it is 
not necessary or desirable for the government to intervene in the adjust- 
ment process, unless there is some distortion that directly affects this 
process (such as those discussed in section 4.5). Moreover, it is clear that 
these principles apply to other distortions of product and factor markets. 
In each  case the correct (first-best) policy is  the policy that  directly 
countervails the distortion. The required magnitude of  the policy in- 
tervention will, in general, reflect the nature of the adjustment process. 
However, provided that there is no direct distortion of  the adjustment 
process, no additional intervention into that process will be required to 
ensure the full efficiency of  the economic system. 
4.7  Second-best Policies and the Adjustment Process 
When the first-best policy that directly countervails a distortion of  the 
product or factor markets cannot be implemented, it may be that the 
second-best combination of policies includes intervention into the adjust- 
ment process, even though such intervention would not be desirable if the 
first-best policy were available. To illustrate this general point, it is useful 
to consider second-best policies to deal with the distortion resulting from 
the failure to impose an optimum tariff, when such a tariff (and other 
equivalent policies) cannot be implemented. 
4.7.1  A Constant Tariff 
First, consider the case where the optimum steady state tariff T (K)  is 
imposed, but where it is not possible to vary the tariff as the economy 
moves its adjustment path. It is easily established that 
If  the  constant  tariff  T (K)  is  imposed, the steady  state  of  the 
economy is the same as under the optimally varying tariff T (K); 
but, under the hypothesis of  (P4), the speed of  convergence to the 
steady state, starting from KO  <  K,  is less than under the optimally 
varying tariff. 
The conclusion that the steady state of the economy is unchanged fallows 
the fact that in the standard two-sector model (with labor and capital both 
freely mobile) there is a unique equilibrium for each specific tariff rate. 
The present  specification of  adjustment technology ensures that this 
steady state equilibrium will be achieved as the end result of  the adjust- 
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ment process. Further, from proposition (P4) we know that T(K)  >  T  (K) 
for any K C  and hence that the price established under the optimally 
varying tariff T (K) is greater than the price that would be established, at 
that K,  under the tariff T (K).  Since the relative price of Xis  higher under 
the tariff T (K), it follows that the incentive to move capital from Z to X 
must be stronger. Hence speed of convergence toward the steady state is 
faster under the optimally varying tariff than under the constant tariff T 
If the tariff is fixed at T (K),  then it is appropriate for the government to 
intervene in the adjustment process in order to obtain a more efficient 
adjustment path. Without going into the details of the derivation of the 
government’s optimal  intervention  policy,  it  may  be  stated that the 
government should subsidize the rental on capital used in X at a rate 
6  (K) -  TxK and tax the movement of  capital from Z to X at a rate 
-6  (K) -  TxI, where 
(0 
(59)  6(K)$O according as K$K 
The subsidy on the rental of capital in Xis  necessary to raise the privately 
perceived benefit of  capital movement to the level of  the true social 
benefit. Given this subsidy on the rental of capital in X, the tax on capital 
movement is necessary to correct a divergence between the privately 
perceived cost of capital movement and the true social cost which arises 
because capital movement that draws resources out of  domestic X pro- 
duction increases imports of X,  and these increased imports have a social 
marginal cost that exceeds their privately perceived cost. As the economy 
converges to its steady state, the required subsidy on the rental of capital 
in X and the required tax on the movement of capital from Z and X both 
decrease to zero. 
Alternately, if  no subsidy is paid on the rental of  capital in X, it is 
necessary to subsidize the movement of  capital from Z to X at the rate 
given by 
(60) 
This subsidy to capital movement does not make the privately perceived 
benefit equal to the true social benefit or the privately perceived cost 
equal to the true social cost; but it does leave exactly offsetting distortions 
to benefits and costs. Hence it produces the second-best optimum path 
for the economy (if  expectations are rational  and i  = r),  given  the 
constraint  that the tariff  cannot be varied (and that other equivalent 
policies cannot be used). 
8 (K)  * T*- +  6 (K)  * TxKexp ( -  r * (s -  t )  )  ds. 99  Government Policy and the Adjustment Process 
4.7.2  A Constant Import Quota 
Second, consider the case where the government restricts imports by 
means of an import quota rather than a tariff. If  we allow the quota, Q,  to 
vary with the distribution of capital, then we can determine the optimally 
varying quota, Q (K),  by simply setting the import quota at any given K 
equal to the level of imports that would occur under the optimally varying 
tariff T(K).  Thus, as one would expect from the standard propositions 
concerning the equivalence of  tariffs and import quotas, there is no 
difference between the optimal path that can be achieved with an opti- 
mally varying quota and the optimal path achieved with an optimally 
varying tariff." 
The path that results from setting the quota at its optimal steady state 
level, Q(Z?),  however, is different from the path that results from setting 
the tariff at T(K).  This difference reflects more than the general principle 
that  a quota that is equivalent to a tariff under one set of  economic 
conditions is not necessarily equivalent to the same tariff under different 
economic conditions. This difference also reflects the endogeneity of the 
process governing the change in economic conditions, and the differential 
impact of the import quota Q(K)  and the tariff T(K)  on this process. In 
particular, it may be established that 
Starting from an initial KO < K,  the speed of  convergence to the 
steady state under a constant import quota Q (K)  is more rapid than 
the  socially  optimal  speed  of convergence under an  optimally 
varying quota or tar$$  and, a  fortiori, more rapid than the speed of 
convergence  under  the  constant,  steady-state-equivalent  tariff 
To demonstrate this result, note that in the proof of  (P4) it was estab- 
lished that  the level of  imports falls as K  rises toward  K along the 
adjustment path produced by the optimally varying tariff T(K).  It follows 
that the optimally varying quota Q(K)  falls as K rises toward 13. Thus, 
for any K < K,  the steady state quota Q(K)  restricts imports more than 
the optimally varying quota Q(K)  (which is equivalent to the optimally 
varying tariff T  (K)).  It follows that the domestic relative price of Xunder 
the quota Q(Z?), at any K  < Z?,  is greater than the price under the 
optimally varying quota. This higher relative price of Xmeans a stronger 
incentive to move capital from 2 and X and hence a more rapid speed of 
convergence to the steady state than under the optimally varying quota. 
The last statement in (P8) follows immediately from (P7).'* 
Further, from proposition (P8) it is clear that if a constant import quota 
Q (K)  were imposed to move the economy from its free trade equilib- 
rium to its optimal steady state position, the government should also 
(p8) 
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intervene in the adjustment process to slow the speed of  convergence 
toward the steady state. It should adopt policies that are the reverse of the 
policies described in the preceding subsection for the case of the constant 
tariff .r(K). 
4.7.3  A Production Subsidy 
Third, consider the case where the government can subsidize domestic 
production of  the import good, but cannot tax domestic consumption, 
impose a tariff, or adopt any equivalent policie~.’~  The problem for the 
social planner is to maximize (40) subject to the constraints (41) and (42) 
and the additional constraint 
(61)  u’(C)  = P* =  J(C -  X)/(C  -  X), 
which expresses the requirement that domestic consumption of X will be 
carried to the point where its marginal utility, U’(C),  is equal to the 
foreign relative price, P* =  J(C -  X)/(C  -  X). 
To determine the solution of this problem, define a modified version of 
the current value Hamiltonian given in (43): 
(43’)  H=  U(C)+B+O.(T(X,IKl,K)-Z) 
+ CY*(J(C-  X)  -  (Z  -  B)) 
+p*(V’(C)-(J(C-X)/(C-X)))+X-k, 
where p is a Lagrangian multiplier assigned to the constraint (61), and 
every other variable has its previous role and interpretation. The opti- 
mum path of the economy must satisfy the same conditions given for the 
optimum tariff in section 4.6, with the addition of the constraint (61), and 
the modification of  the conditions (44) and (46) to the following: 
(44‘)  dHlaC=U’+(~.J’+p.(U’’-a)=0, 
(46’) 
where 
(62)  a = dP*/d(C -  X)  = (J’/(C  -  X))  -  (J/(C  -  X)2)>0. 
Two important implications of  these conditions (which may be stated 
without going into a detailed description of the second-best optimal path 
of  the economy) are summarized in the following proposition: 
To induce private agents (with rational expectations and i = r) to 
follow the second-best optimal path, it is necessary for the govern- 
ment to give a subsidy to domestic producers of X  which varies 
appropriately with the distribution of capital and which makes the 
price received by domestic producers, P, equal to the social mar- 
ginal  value  of  domestically produced X, Given this production 
dH/dX=  O.T,-  a.J’ + @.a  = 0, 
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subsidy, no direct intervention into the adjustment process is re- 
quired to achieve the second-best optimal path of the economy. 
The required production subsidy (measured in units of 2 per unit of 
domestically produced X)  may be determined from the conditions (61), 
(44’), and (46’) to be 
(63) 
Given this  subsidy, the price  received by  domestic producers  of  X, 
P = P* + u,  is an appropriate weighted average of the value to consum- 
ers of  additional X  consumption, U’ (C)  = P *, and the marginal cost of 
imports, J’  (C  -  X);  specifically, 
(64) 
where the weights are the fractions by which an additional unit of domes- 
tically produced X  would increase domestic consumption and reduce 
imports, respectively. This production subsidy will vary with the distribu- 
tion of  capital; but it is not possible to establish general propositions 
similar to (P7) and (P8) that characterize the nature of this variation. Nor 
is it possible to say, in general, whether the steady state value of K under 
the second-best production subsidy is greater or less than K under the 
optimum tariff. 
The conclusion that no intervention in the adjustment process is re- 
quired follows from the fact that the production subsidy makes the prices 
confronting the production sector of  the economy (which includes the 
adjustment process) correspond to true social marginal values. In par- 
ticular, since the condition (48) remains intact, it follows that the govern- 
ment need not tax or subsidize the movement of capital; and since the 
condition (49) remains intact, it follows that the government need not tax 
or subsidize the rental received by  capital in either industry. 
u  = (- U”/(a  -  U”)).(J’ -  P*). 
P=  (a/(a  -  U”))*P*  + (- U”/(a  -  U”)).S, 
4.7.4  A Consumption Tax 
Fourth, consider the case where the government can tax domestic 
consumption of the import good, but cannot subsidize domestic produc- 
tion, impose a tariff, or adopt any equivalent policies. The problem for 
the social planner is now to maximize (40) subject to the constraints (41) 
and (42) and the additional constraint 
(65)  -  T,(X, Ikl,K) = P* =J(C  -  X)/(C  -  X), 
which expresses the requirement that the price facing domestic producers 
of X  is the price prevailing in foreign trade. 
To determine the solution of  this problem, define a new modified 
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(43")  H = u(c)  + B + e.(T(x,K,zq  -  z) 
+ a.(J(C -  X)  -  (2 -  B)) 
+  A-K, 
+y-(-Tx(X,K,K)  -  (J(C-X)/(C-X))) 
where y is a Lagrangian multiplier assigned to the constraint (65) and 
every other variable has its previous role and interpretation. The opti- 
mum path must satisfy the usual initial and boundary conditions, the 
constraints (41), (42), and (65), and the following modified forms of the 
conditions (44) through (49): 
(44")  aHiac= U' + WJ' -  y.~  = 0, 
(45")  dH/aB=l+a=O, 
(46")  dH/dX = 8  * Tx -  J' -  * (  Txx -  u ) = 0, 
(47")  aHiaz= -e-a=o, 
(48")  dH/dK=sign(K)*(8.TI-y.TxI)  +A=O, 
(49") 
where a = dP*/d(C  -  X)  > 0 is defined in (62). 
follows from (65) and (46") that 
A = r.A -  8-  TK  +  ye  TxK, 
From (45") and (47"), it follows that 8 = -a  = 1. Given this result, it 
(66)  y = (J' -  P*)/(u  -  Txx) > 0. 
Further, define P'  = U' (C) as the price facing domestic consumers. This 
price is enforced by  a consumption tax of  T'  units of  Z  per unit of  X 
consumed, which makes P" = P* + 7'. From (44"), (46"), and (66), it 
follows that 
(67)  7'  = -  y '  Txx = ( -  Txx/(U -  Txx))  ' (J' -  P*). 
This makes sense since it implies that P" is an appropriate weighted 
average of the marginal cost of domestically  produced X, -  Tx = P  * ,  and 
the marginal cost of  imports, J'  (C -  X), 
(68)  P"=P* +T'=(U/(U-Txx))'P* 
+ (- Txx/(a  -  Txx))*J', 
where the weights are the fractions by which domestic production and 
imports would be increased if consumption of X were increased by a unit. 
The consumption tax, however, is not the only policy that the govern- 
ment must employ to place the economy on its second-best optimal path. 
As indicated in  the following proposition, the government must  also 
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When the price facing domestic producers is constrained to equal 
the foreign price  P*, the  second-best  combination  of  policies 
includes a tax on domestic consumption of X, a tax on the move- 
ment of  capital, and a subsidy on the rental of  capital used in X. 
(P10) 
From (48"), it follows that the required tax on the movement of capital is 
given by -  y * Tx-  >  0. From (49"), it follows  that the required subsidy on 
the rental of  capital used in Xis given by -  y *  T,,  > 0. These interven- 
tions are required in order to make the privately perceived costs and 
benefits of  capital movement correspond to the true social costs and 
benefits. 
The rationale for this intervention  into the adjustment process can 
easily be understood by considering what would happen, starting from 
steady state free-trade equilibrium, if  the government imposed only a 
consumption tax. This tax would reduce consumption and hence reduce 
imports. This is beneficial since (at the initial equilibrium) the marginal 
cost of imports exceeds their marginal value of  consumers. By reducing 
the foreign price P*,  which is the price facing domestic producers, the 
consumption tax would also reduce domestic production of X, thereby 
tending to increase imports. This is harmful, but the harm is unavoidable 
since (by assumption) the government cannot intervene to make the price 
to domestic producers differ from P*.  The reduction in price of X facing 
domestic producers also reduces the rental on capital in X below the 
rental on capital in 2. This motivates private capital owners to move 
capital from X to 2.  In the short run, this is harmful because the process 
of  capital movement diverts resources from domestic production of X and 
increases imports which have a marginal cost that is higher than P*.  In 
the long run, this is harmful because even after the process of  movement 
is complete, the lower capital stock in Xmeans less domestic production 
of X and hence larger imports. To counteract the short-run harm associ- 
ated with the process of  capital movement, it  is appropriate for the 
government to tax capital movement. To counteract the long-run harm 
that would result from a redistribution of capital away from X and toward 
2,  it is appropriate for the government to remove the motivation for this 
redistribution  by  subsidizing the rental earned by  capital employed in 
producing X. 
The steady state position resulting from the combination of policies in 
(P10) is the same as the equilibrium position in the standard two-sector 
model when  the government  uses the second-best combination of  a 
consumption tax and a subsidy to capital used inX.  The subsidy to capital 
used in X is beneficial because it operates, in part, like a production 
subsidy; but  this  benefit must  be  balanced  against loss of  efficiency 
resulting from the factor market distortion associated with a subsidy to 
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If a subsidy cannot be paid on the rental of capital used in X,  then as a 
third-best policy the government should combine a tax on the consump- 
tion of X with a tax on the movement of  capital out of  X. Indeed, if  the 
optimal steady state level of  capital in X under the policies of (P10) were 
above the initial level KO,  it would be appropriate for the government to 
levy a prohibitive tax on the movement of capital in order to prevent the 
consumption tax from moving the distribution of  capital even further 
from the optimal steady state distribution. 
Finally, it is important to indicate why it is appropriate for the govern- 
ment to intervene in the adjustment process in conjunction with a con- 
sumption tax, but not in conjunction with a production subsidy. This is 
because the adjustment process resides in the production sector of  the 
economy and the production subsidy removes all distortions from this 
sector of the economy; specifically, it makes the relative price of Xfacing 
domestic producers correspond to the social marginal value of  an addi- 
tional unit of domestically produced X.  In contrast, under the consump- 
tion tax, the price facing domestic producers of  X  does not equal the 
social marginal value of an additional unit of  domestically produced X. 
This divergence between price and social marginal value distorts the 
adjustment process and hence justifies additional government interven- 
tion to correct this distortion. If  the adjustment process resided exclu- 
sively in the consumption sector of the economy rather than the produc- 
tion sector, then no intervention into the adjustment process would be 
required in conjunction with a consumption tax, but such intervention 
would be required in conjunction with a production subsidy. More gener- 
ally, if the adjustment process is partly in the production sector and partly 
in the consumption sector, then some intervention into the adjustment 
process will be desirable in conjunction with either a second-best con- 
sumption tax or a second-best production subsidy. Moreover, this princi- 
ple applies not only to second-best policies to deal with a divergence 
between the social and private cost of  imports, but also to second-best 
policies to deal with other distortions. 
4.8  Extensions, Generalizations, and Conclusions 
So far, the analysis in this paper has focused exclusively on the issue of 
the economic efficiency of  the adjustment process and has ignored the 
important quetions concerning the effects on the distribution of income 
of government policies directed at the adjustment process. The preceding 
analysis has also been limited in that it has been based on a single, specific 
model of  adjustment technology. The purpose of  this section is to par- 
tially remedy these deficiencies and to summarize the general principles 
concerning the role of  government policy in the adjustment process that 
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4.8.1 Income Distribution and the Adjustment Process 
In discussing questions of income distribution, it is important to dis- 
tinguish between the “personal distribution of  income” and the “func- 
tional distribution of  income. ” The “personal distribution of  income” 
refers to the distribution of income among individuals in the society, by 
income levels, but not to the levels of  income of  specific individuals. 
Theoretical analyses of economic equity are usually concerned with this 
concept of  the distribution of  income. The “functional distribution of 
income” refers to the distribution of  income among different types of 
factors of production, as determined by the prices paid for the productive 
services they supply. Changes in the functional distribution of income, in 
general, imply important changes in the incomes of specific individuals  in 
the society, and hence are of  great interest to these individuals. But, 
without strong assumptions about the distribution of ownership of  var- 
ious factors of  production among individuals, it is not possible to reach 
conclusions concerning the consequences for the personal distribution of 
income of changes in the structure of factor prices. 
Since the model analyzed in previous sections does not include specific 
assumptions about the distribution of factor ownership, it cannot be used 
to investigate questions concerning the personal distribution of  income. 
It can, however, be used to  examine two general and important questions 
relating to the functional distribution of  income: What is the effect of 
various  government  policies designed to affect the efficiency of  the 
adjustment process on the functional distribution of income? What is the 
effect of government policies designed to affect the functional distribu- 
tion of  income on the efficiency of the adjustment process? These ques- 
tions are of considerable importance because individual factor owners are 
obviously concerned  with the effects of  government policies on the 
incomes of  the particular factors  that  they  own, and because  much 
government policy (particularly in the area of international trade policy) 
is directed to protecting the incomes of particular factor owners, regard- 
less of  any general objectives of economic equity related to the personal 
distribution of income. 
With respect to long-run equilibrium, the model of productive technol- 
ogy described in section 4.2 is identical to  the standard two-sector model. 
Hence the Stolper-Samuelson theorem describes the long-run equilib- 
rium response of  factor rewards to any change in the relative output 
price. Specifically, assuming that X  is relatively capital-intensive, it fol- 
lows that an increase in P  will increase the rental received by capital, 
measured in terms of either X  or Z, and will decrease the wage received 
by labor, measured in terms of  either X  or Z. 
In discussing the short-run effects of policy and parametric changes on 
the functional distribution of  income, it is necessary to distinguish be- 
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same wage in both final goods industries and in the activity of  capital 
movement. Holding the amount of labor devoted to capital movement 
constant, an increase in P increases the wage measured in terms of 2  and 
reduces the wage measured in terms of X,  implying that labor has no 
clear-cut short-run interest in policies that either increase or reduce P. 
Since capital movement uses only labor, however, an increase in the rate 
of capital movement increases the wage in terms of  both goods, implying 
a short-run benefit to labor. Capital employed in X  enjoys a short-run 
gain, measured in terms of  both goods, from an increase in P, holding 
constant the amount of labor used in capital movement; and conversely 
for capital employed in 2.  An increase in the wage rate induced by an 
increase in the demand for labor in capital movement is disadvantageous 
to capital employed in either indu~try.'~ 
When there is a divergence between the short-run response and the 
long-run response of a factor price to a policy or parametric change, the 
interest of the factor owner is presumably determined by the effect on the 
present discounted value of his income stream. If  X  is relatively capital- 
intensive, owners of capital initially employed in X  will be very likely to 
benefit, in terms of  present discounted value, from an increase in the 
relative price of  X.I6 If  the movement of  capital requires only small 
amounts of  labor (i.e., if the coefficient p in [3] is small), then capital will 
shift rapidly from 2  to X,  with little impact on the wage rate from the use 
of  labor in capital movement.  In this case, owners of  capital initially 
employed in 2 will also benefit from an increase in P. Moreover, if  p is 
small, owners of capital initially employed in either industry are likely to 
benefit and workers are likely to lose, in terms of  present discounted 
value, from a subsidy to capital movement imposed subsequent to an 
increase in P. This is because the short-run effect of the subsidy to capital 
movement in increasng the wage rate will be outweighed by the decline in 
the wage rate and the increase in the rental rates associated with the more 
rapid  shift of  capital from the labor-intensive to the capital-intensive 
industry.  On the other hand, if  p is small, then a subsidy to capital 
movement will benefit workers and harm capital owners in the event of a 
decrease in P. If  p is large, then a subsidy to capital movement may 
benefit workers and harm capital owners in the event of any change in P. 
This is because labor will have sharply declining marginal productivity in 
capital movement. Hence a subsidy to capital movement will increase the 
wage rate over a substantial period of time, by increasing the demand for 
labor in capital movement, but will not  increase to a commensurate 
extent the speed of movement of capital from one industry to another. 
These results  illustrate  the implications of  the model discussed in 
previous sections for the incidental consequences for the functional dis- 
tribution of income of  government policies directed at affecting output 
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the process of adjustment of policies directed toward affecting the func- 
tional distribution of income. Specifically, suppose that there has been a 
decline in the relative price of  X in world trade and that, for political 
reasons, the government desires to protect owners of  capital (including 
human capital) employed in X, the import-competing industry, from the 
consequences of  this price change. Of  course, the government might 
simply impose a tariff that would keep the domestic relative price of X  at 
its previous level. But  suppose this tariff  cannot be  imposed, either 
because the government  recognizes the production  and consumption 
distortion losses it would generate or because other domestic political 
considerations preclude the tariff or because the government fears for- 
eign retaliation. Further, suppose that the objective of government policy 
is not to protect owners of  capital employed in X from the long-run 
deterioration of the income of capital in both industries that would result 
from a reduction in the relative price of  the capital-intensive good, but 
only to protect them from the additional loss that they suffer relative to 
owners of capital initially located in 2.  The first-best  policy to achieve this 
objective is a lump-sum wealth transfer to the owner of  each unit of 
capital initially employed in X equal to the present discounted value of 
the difference between the rental of a unit of capital employed in 2 and 
the rental of a unit of capital employed in 2.  An equivalent policy is a flow 
transfer to owners of  capital initially employed in X equal to the differ- 
ence between the rental on capital employed in 2 and the rental on 
capital employed in X.  Both of  these policies are nondistorting with 
respect to the process of  adjustment. 
It is important to recognize that a flow transfer paid to owners of capital 
initially  employed in X is very different from a flow transfer paid to 
owners of  capital that remains employed in X. The latter policy which 
makes  receipt  of  the transfer  contingent  on capital  remaining in X 
seriously distorts the adjustment process.  In fact, if  the level of  the 
subsidy were set equal to the current rental differential between capital 
located  in 2 and capital located  in X, then all incentive for capital 
movement would be removed and there would be no adjustment toward 
the new long-run equilibrium appropriate for the lower world relative 
price of X. More generally, if the transfer to owners of capital inXwas  set 
equal to a fraction of  the rental differential or was made to decline 
gradually over time, some incentive for capital movement would be 
retained, but the rate of capital movement would be reduced to below the 
socially optimal rate. This is because the linking of transfer payments to 
the current location of capital, rather than its initial location, creates an 
artificial incentive to keep capital employed in X. 
If  practical or political considerations rule out wealth and income 
transfers as a means for compensating those adversely affected by chang- 
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“adjustment assistance” as an alternative means of providing such com- 
pensation. It is noteworthy that in the model developed in this paper, 
adjustment assistance in the form of a subsidy to capital movement is not 
likely to be  beneficial to owners of  capital initially employed in  the 
capital-intensive industry when there is a decline in the relative price of 
that industry’s output. In the short run, such a subsidy will work to the 
disadvantage of  capital owners by  increasing the demand for labor in 
capital movement and thus the wage rate. In the longer run, more rapid 
movement of  capital out of  the capital-intensive industry and into the 
labor-intensive industry implies that the return to capital in both indus- 
tries will decline more rapidly, in accord with the dictates of the Stolper- 
Samuelson theorem. From this theorem, it also follows that a subsidy to 
capital movement is more likely to be beneficial to owners of  capital 
initially employed in  the labor-intensive industry when  that industry 
suffers a decline in its relative output price. 
These results concerning the effects of  adjustment assistance do not 
necessarily apply under alternative assumptions about productive tech- 
nology, particularly the technology of  the adjustment process, or under 
other assumptions about the form of  adjustment  assistance. They do 
illustrate, however, the general proposition that assistance to factors of 
production in moving out of  declining industries is not necessarily bene- 
ficial to the owners of  these factors. Moreover, it should be emphasized 
that whatever  the income distributional  consequences of  adjustment 
assistance, such assistance is likely to interfere with the efficiency of the 
adjustment process,  unless it countervails some other distortion that 
affects the adjustment process. 
4.8.2  Alternative Adjustment Technologies 
In the model of  adjustment technology presented in section 4.2, the 
economy’s total capital stock is assumed fixed and the only adjustment 
activity consists of  using labor to move capital from one industry to 
another. It is useful to consider briefly the implications of a more general 
model of  adjustment technology, which retains the same basic assump- 
tions about the technology for producing final outputs, but allows adjust- 
ment bo.th in the distribution of capital between industries and in the total 
size of the capital stock. Specifically, suppose that capital in each industry 
depreciates at a constant exponential rate 6 and that the amount of labor 
required to replace depreciating capital, create new capital, and move 
capital from one industry to another is given by 
where Zx = Kx  + 6  Kx  measures gross investment in capital in X  and 
I,  = kz + 6.  Kz measures gross investment in capital in 2.  The function 
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for the two industries;  it is assumed that H‘ > 0 and H”  2  0. The 
functions Qx( ) and Q, ( ) are the “Penrose functions” which indicate 
the amount of labor required to alter the scale of production facilities in 
order to accommodate changes in the size of  the capital stock employed 
in a particular industry; it is assumed that Qx(0)  = Qz(0) = 0,  Qk(0)  = 
QL (0) = 0, Q; > 0,  and Qg > 0.’’ 
To illustrate the general implications of the adjustment technology 
embodied  in  (69), it is useful to consider three special cases. First, 
suppose that the depreciation rate is zero and that the aggregate capital 
stock Kx  + Kz is fixed. In this case (69) reduces to 
(70)  Lz= Qx(ix>  + Qz(-kx). 
This labor requirements function is a generalization of the labor require- 
ments function for capital movement given in  (3). Since the two labor 
requirements functions (3) and (70) share all of the same essential prop- 
erties, they share all of  the same implications. 
Second, suppose that the Penrose functions, Qx and Q,, are elimi- 
nated from (69), and further suppose that marginal labor requirements 
for capital goods production, H’ (Zx+Zz), are strictly increasing as a 
function of total gross investment.I8  To analyze the process of adjustment 
under this assumption about adjustment technology, it is useful to define 
px(t)  and pz(t) as the present discounted values of the stream of rentals 
that would be produced by a unit of  capital initially located in the two 
respective industries at time t; that is,  l9 
(71) 
ca 
(72)  PZ(t) =  Rz(s)exp(-  (I+ 8)-(s-t))h. 
Since newly produced capital can be located at zero cost in either indus- 
try, it will be located only in the industry for which px(t) or bz(t)  is the 
largest, and the level of  gross investment will be determined  by  the 
condition 
(73)  W.  H‘ (ZX +  ZZ) =  (Px  (t  1  ,  Pz 0)  1  7 
where Wis the wage rate consistent with the requirement of labor market 
equilibrium, namely, 
(74)  ex(WIP)-K, + e,(W).K, +  H(ZX+ZZ) = L. 
Given P, the conditions (73) and (74) jointly determine W and Zx+Zz  as 
functions of Kx,  Kz, px,  and pz. When I.L~  # pz, net investment in each 
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the industry with the highest p. The rental rates on capital in the two 
industries, the allocation of  labor between industries, and their outputs 
are also determined as functions of the state variables, Kx  and Kx,  and 
the costate variables, px and pz, given P. 
For the economy to have a steady state, associated with a given value of 
P, in which the capital stock in both industries is positive, it must be the 
case that at this steady state px = Rx/  (I  +  6)  is equal to pz = RZ/  (I  +  6). 
For this to happen, the rental rates on capital in the two industries, as well 
as the wage rates paid to labor, must be the same. Thus, at the steady 
state equilibrium, the conditions of the two-sector model with respect to 
product and factor prices must apply, implying that the steady state wage 
rate and the steady state rental rates on capital in both industries are 
determined by the output price ratio and the properties of the production 
functions for final outputs; say, W = W* (P)  and Rx  = RZ = R* (P).  It 
follows that the steady state values of  px and pz, denoted by an under- 
score, are given by 
(75)  px=  -  R*(P)l(r+6)  = p,.  - 
Further, since gross investment  in  the steady state must  equal total 
depreciation, it follows that the steady state capital stocks in  the two 
industries, denoted by Kx  and KZ,  must satisfy 
(76)  W*(P).H’(6.(&x+  &))  = R*(P)/(r+  6). 
The combinations of Kx  and Kz  that satisfy this condition are illustrated 
by the line labeled &Kin figure 4.6, which has a slope of -  1. In addition, 
the steady state capital stocks must be consistent with full employment of 
the economy’s supply of  labor; that is, 
(77)  [x(W*  (PI PI.  Kx  + 4,  (  W*  (P  1  * Kz 
+ H(6*(&+  Kz))  = L. 
The combinations of  Kx  and Kz that satisfy this condition are illustrated 
by the line labeled LL in figure 4.6. This line is flatter than the KK line 
because, by assumption, X is relatively capital-intensive, implying that 
tX(W*  (P)/P)  <  tz(W*  (P)).  The intersectionof the KKline and the LL 
line in figure 4.6 determines the steady state capital stocks for the two 
industries and the aggregate steady state capital stock, & = Kx  + Kz, 
appropriate for the given output price ratio. 
A change in the output price ratio alters the steady state position of the 
economy. The steady state responses of the wage rate and the rental rates 
of capital in the two industries are the same as in the standard two-sector 
model. This reflects the assumption that newly produced capital can be 
installed at zero cost in either industry and hence must earn the same 
steady state rental in either industry. It is not the case, however, that the 
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Fig. 4.6  Steady state capital stocks and adjustment paths when there 
are not installation costs. 
outputs remain  unchanged in  the face of  a change in P, as they are 
assumed to do in the standard two-sector model. Specifically, an increase 
in P, the relative price of  the capital-intensive good X,  increases the 
aggregate steady state capital stock, K  = KX  + Kz, and increases the 
amount of  labor required to support this capital stock, LI = H(&*K), 
thereby reducing the amoung of  labor, L - LI,  used to produce final 
outputs. From the Rybczynski theorem, it follows that output of  X  rises 
and output of 2 declines by significantly more than would be the case if 
the aggregate capital stock and the amount of labor used to produce final 
outputs both remained constant in the face of  the increase in  P.*O 
The nature of  the process of  convergence to the steady state appropri- 
ate for a given value of Pis  also illustrated in figure 4.6. It may be shown 
that for combinations of Kx  and Kz lying below the L_L line, pz  is always 112  Michael Mussa 
greater than px,  implying that the entire production of new capital will be 
allocated to maintaining and increasing capital in 2 and that capital in X 
declines at the rate  6.K,.  Thus, below the  L_L_  line, the direction of 
movement is upward and toward the left, until this line is reached. Above 
the LL  line, it may be shown that px  is always greater than p,,  implying 
that all newly produced capital is allocated to X  and that Kz declines at 
the rate 6.  K,.  Far above the L_L_ line, production of new capital will not 
be sufficient to maintain the level of  K,,  and both Kx  and K, will  be 
falling. Nearer to the LL line, production of  new capital will  exceed 
6  * K,,  implying that K, will be rising while KZ  is declining. When the LL 
line is reached, from either above or below, the economy moves along 
this line in the direction of its steady state position (&,  Kz).  Along this 
line, the wage rate and rental rates on capital are at their steady state 
values, W*  (P)  and R* (P),  and px = p,  = R* (P)/(r+  6). The level of 
gross investment, Z,  + Z,,  and the amount of labor allocated to produc- 
ing new capital, LI = H(Z, + I,), are both at their steady state values, 8 . 
(K, +Kz)  and H(6 -  (Kx  + K,)), respectively. Movement along the 
L_L line is achieved by  allocating the supply of  new capital to the two 
industries in a manner that keeps the economy on this line. 
Three features of  this adjustment process deserve special notice. (1) 
Since the LL  line will always be reached in finite time, the wage rate and 
the rental rates on capital in the two industries will reach their steady state 
values, determined by the standard two-sector model, in finite time. (2) 
The capital stock in an industry need not converge monotonically to its 
steady state value, if  the economy starts from a point off the LL  line. This 
lack of monotonicity also applies to the outputs of the two industries, but 
not to the aggregate capital stock, the level of gross investment, or factor 
prices.  (3) The movement of  capital from one industry to another is 
achieved by allocating the production of  new capital so as not to replace 
capital that  depreciates in  the industry that should have a declining 
capital stock. Thus, in this special case of the general adjustment technol- 
ogy (69), the movement of capital is not “costly” in the sense that it does 
not require an explicit use of  scarce factors of  production. 
The third special case of  (69) is the general case where the Penrose 
functions,  Q,(kx) and  Q,(Zkz),  are  added  on  to  the  function 
H(Zx+  Zz).  For a given relative output price and given values of the state 
variables, Kx  and K,,  and the costate variables, px  and pz, as defined in 
(71) and (72), the momentary equilibrium wage rate and the levels of 
gross and net investment in the two industries are determined by  the 
requirements 
(78)  w*[H’(Ix+Iz)  + Qa(kx)l=  PX, 
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(80)  tx(WIP)*Kx+  tz(W)*Kz+H(Zx+Zz) 
+ Qx(kx)  + Qz(Kz>  = L. 
Given the solutions for the wage rate and the levels of  gross and net 
investment  in  the two industries, the amounts of  labor  employed in 
producing the two final outputs, the levels of these outputs, and the rental 
rates for capital in the two industries are also determined as functions of 
By  assumption, Q,(O)  = Qz(0) = 0 and  Q;U(O)  = Qk(0) = 0. It 
follows that in steady state equilibrium, where Kx = kz  = 0, the Penrose 
functions and their derivatives disappear from (78), (79), and (80). Thus, 
with respect to steady state equilibrium, (80) reduces to (74), and (78) 
and (79) reduce to (73), plus the requirement that kx = pz. It follows 
that the conditions that must apply in steady state equilibrium under the 
general form of  (69) are the same as those that apply in the special case 
where the Penrose functions are omitted from (69). Hence the analysis of 
steady state equilibrium under the general form of  (69) is exactly the 
same as under this previously considered special case. 
Where the Penrose functions do matter is in analyzing the process of 
convergence toward the steady state. When these functions are elimi- 
nated from (69), any difference between px  and pz  (that is, anywhere off 
the LL_ line in figure 4.6) implies that all of  gross investment is allocated 
to the industry with the higher shadow price for a unit of  capital. This 
applies even in the neighborhood of the steady state (off of the L_L_ line), 
where the difference between kx  and pz is small, but the level of  gross 
investment is relatively large (equal approximately to its steady state 
level, 6.(Kx  + Kz)).  When the Penrose functions are present in the 
adjustment technology, we no longer have this peculiarity. In the neigh- 
borhood of  the steady state, where the difference between px and kZ  is 
small, gross investment will be divided between the two industries so that 
the level of net investment in each industry is close to its steady state value 
of zero, for  otherwise the conditions (78) and (79) would not be satisfied. 
In fact, there must be a region in the neighborhood of  the steady state 
where net investment in both industries is positive, and another region 
where net investment in both industries is negative. These regions exist 
because,  when  the  Penrose functions are present  in  the adjustment 
technology, the movement of  capital is a costly activity, and this cost 
cannot be avoided simply by reallocating newly produced capital between 
the two industries. 
The exact pattern of adjustment of the capital stocks in the two indus- 
tries to their respective steady state values, &  and &, depends on the 
exact properties of the Penrose functions. One possible pattern of adjust- 
ment is illustrated in figure 4.7. In this figure, the Kx = 0 line and the Kz 
Kx,  Kz,  Px,  and Pz, given p. 114  Michael Mussa 
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Fig. 4.7  Steady state capital stocks and adjustment paths with increas- 
ing marginal installation costs. 
= 0 line show the combinations of Kx  and Kz for which net investment in 
the two industries, respectively, is equal to zero. These lines intersect at 
the steady state point (Kxand Kz)  and divide the plane into four regions: 
a region where Kx >  0 and Kz  >  0; a region where K?  <  0 and K? < 0; a 
region where Kx  >  0 and Kz  <  0; and a region where Kx  <  0 and Kz >  0. 
The arrows in the diagram indicate the direction of  movement of  the 
capital stock in each industry in each of  the four regions. Convergence to 
the steady state is necessarily noncyclic, though it need not be the case 
that the capital stock in each industry converges monotonically to its 
steady state value. 
4.8.3  General Conclusions 
It is worthwhile to investigate the generality of the conclusions  reached 
earlier in this paper under the alternative adjustment technology spe- 115  Government Policy and the Adjustment Process 
cified in (69). First, the key proposition that private maximizing behavior 
will lead to a socially optimal adjustment path, provided that there are no 
distortions in the economy, that the private discount rate is equal to the 
social discount rate, and that private agents have rational expectations, 
remains valid under the adjustment technology specified in (69). Under 
private maximization, the shadow prices kX  and pz that are used by the 
social  planner to guide level and disposition of investment are replaced by 
the values that private asset owners assign to units of capital located in the 
two industries. Provided that there are no distortions in the economic 
system that cause the rental received by private capital owners to differ 
from the values of  the marginal products of capital in the two industries, 
provided that the discount rate used by private asset owners is equal to 
the  social discount rate, and provided that expectations concerning future 
rentals earned by capital in the two industries are rational, the values of 
units of  capital located in the two industries assigned by private asset 
owners will equal the shadow prices established by the social planner. 
The process of adjustment that occurs under the guidance of these capital 
values will be the same as that determined by the social planner. More- 
over, it is clear that this principle of the social optimality of  the adjust- 
ment process under private maximizing behavior (which is a special case 
of  Adam Smith’s principle of  the invisible hand) carries over to more 
general assumptions about adjustment technology and to more general 
models of  production of  final outputs. 
Second, when there are distortions that directly affect the adjustment 
process, there is rationale for government intervention to directly coun- 
tervail these distortions. In particular, it remains true under the adjust- 
ment technology specified in (69) that a proportional tax on income from 
capital (or on all factor income) distorts the adjustment process, even if 
such a tax allows an appropriate deduction for depreciation. The reason 
is that such a tax reduces privately received (after tax) rentals from capital 
ownership to below the true social rentals and hence induces private asset 
owners to assign lower values to units of capital located in either industry 
than would be assigned by the social planner. This results in a steady state 
capital stock that is smaller than the socially optimal capital stock and, in 
general, also distorts the process of convergence toward the steady state. 
An investment tax credit that allows capital owners to deduct from their 
current tax liability both the cost of newly produced capital and the costs 
of  variations in the scale of  production  associated with  the Penrose 
functions, but eliminates subsequent depreciation allowances, will cor- 
rect this distortion. In the long run, however, such a credit will have a 
serious effect on the government’s tax revenue since it amounts to an 
elimination of  the tax on income from capital for  all capital that is 
installed  after the credit  is instituted. If  the lost revenue  cannot  be 
replaced by lump-sum nondistorting taxes, then the benefits of reducing 
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have to be weighed against the distortions created by the alternative taxes 
used to replace the lost tax revenue. 
Third, when there are distortions in the product or factor markets that 
do not specifically affect the adjustment process, such as the failure to 
impose an optimum tariff, then the first-best policy is to countervail these 
distortions directly. In general, the countervailing tax or subsidy will not 
be constant, but will vary with the size and distribution of the economy’s 
capital stock. However, provided that the first-best policy to correct the 
product market distortion is implemented, no further intervention into 
the adjustment process will be required  in order to ensure a socially 
optimal adjustment path. 
Fourth, preliminary analysis suggests that the specific propositions 
concerning the behavior of  the optimum tariff along the path of conver- 
gence to the steady state that were stated in section 4.6 probably do 
generalize to the adjustment technology specified in (69). In particular, it 
may be shown that the relative positions of  the steady state equilibria 
under free trade and under the optimum tariff are such that convergence 
of the capital stock in each industry and of  the aggregate capital stock to 
their steady values under the optimum tariff, starting from the free trade 
steady state, are monotonic when the Penrose functions are eliminated 
from (69). This point is critical in establishing the analogs of the proposi- 
tions (P4), (P5), (P7), and (P8) for the adjustment technology specified in 
(69). It cannot be presumed, however, that specific  propositions concern- 
ing properties of  the  adjustment path  are generally invariant to the 
specification of  adjustment technology. 
Fifth, when the first-best policies to correct product or factor market 
distortions are not available, the second-best combination of policies may 
involve intervention into the adjustment process. This is the case when- 
ever the adjustment process becomes distorted as a result of  a second- 
best policy directed at some other distortion. In particular, the imposition 
of  a consumption tax as a second-best policy to correct for a divergence 
between the social marginal cost of imports and their privately perceived 
cost should generally be combined with a policy to discourage the move- 
ment of  resources out of  the import-competing sector that would other- 
wise be.induced by the depressing effect of  the consumption tax on the 
price  facing domestic producers of  the import good.  A  second-best 
production  subsidy, however, will not require additional intervention 
into the adjustment process because this subsidy removes all distortions 
from the production sector of the economy, which is assumed to include 
the adjustment process. 
Finally, it is worthwhile to summarize the general philosphy concern- 
ing government policy toward the adjustment process that is suggested by 
the preceding analysis. Adjustment to changing conditions of  interna- 
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investment decisions in which the costs of  adjustment must be weighed 
against the expected future benefits. In many economies, such decisions 
are to a large extent made by private agents who pursue their individual 
self-interest. A principal objective of  government policy should be to 
create an environment in which the decisions of  these agents lead to a 
socially appropriate outcome by removing the general distortions, includ- 
ing the distortions associated with government taxes and transfers, that 
cause the privately perceived benefits or costs of  adjustment to diverge 
substantially from the true social benefits or costs. In addition, there may 
be instances of  clearly identifiable distortions of  the adjustment process 
for particular industries,  perhaps resulting from government policies 
pursued for other purposes, that justify specific interventions to either 
enhance or impede the adjustment process. Lastly, care must be taken in 
designing policies to compensate factor owners who suffer losses as a 
result of  changing economic conditions in  order to ensure that such 
compensation does not interfere unduly or unnecessarily  with the private 
incentive to achieve socially efficient adjustment. 
Notes 
1. The process of  adjustment to changing conditions of  international  trade and the 
influence of  the adjustment process on government policy have not been totally neglected in 
the literature; see, in particular, Baldwin, Mutti, and Richardson (1978), Kemp and Wan 
(1974), Lapan (1976), Mayer (1974), Mussa (1978), and Neary (1978). 
2.  This model of adjustment technology is the same as that presented in Mussa (1978). 
3.  It is inconvenient to assume that labor requirements for capital movement are pro- 
portional to the rate of  capital movement because this implies that the marginal cost of 
capital movement is always strictly positive. With a strictly positive marginal cost of capital 
movement, the economy will not, in general, converge to a steady state position that is the 
same as the equilibrium position in the standard two-sector model. Instead, as Kemp and 
Wan (1974) point out, there are “hysteresis effects” which make the steady state position of 
the economy dependent on its initial position. To avoid the difficulties associated with such 
“hysteresis  effects”  and preserve  as much  as possible  the  properties  of  the  standard 
two-sector model, it is convenient to assume that labor requirements for capital movement 
are determined by (3). 
4.  The i  = 0 line in figure 4.1  is shown as everywhere negatively sloped. It cannot be 
proved that the i  = 0 line will necessarily have this property. However, it can be shown that 
there is a unique intersection of the  = 0 line with the K = 0 line (identical with the K axis), 
occurring at the optimal steady state value of  K that corresponds to the distribution of 
capital determined in the standard two-sector model. At this steady state, the A  = 0 ljne is 
negatively sloped. Everywhere except in the neighborhood of  the steady state K, the A  = 0 
line is bounded away from the K axis. These facts are sufficient to establish that there is a 
unique optimum path converging to the steady state which lies above the K axis for K < 
a (P)  and below the K axis for K > I?  (P).  It follows that the distribution of  capital always 
converges monotonically to its optimal steady state distribution. 
5. The assumption of competitive behavior is questionable since the production function 
for capital movement is not linear homogeneous. The assumption of competitive behavior 118  Michael Mussa 
could be justified,  however,  if  firms producing  the  service of  capital  movement were 
assumed to use a Cobb-Douglas production function, I = (L,.  S,)’”,  where LI  is the amount 
of labor employed by such a firm and S,  is the amount of capital so employed. Capital used in 
producing the service of capital movement is specific  to that activity, and the total amount of 
such capital is equal to 3,. The demand for labor by firms supplying the service of  capital 
movement would, under these assumptions, be given by LI(W,  q) = 3,  .  (q/2W)’. 
6. In the analysis of the optimum tariff in section 4.6  and of  various second-best policies 
in section 4.7, the path of  the output price is endogenously determined  by  the general 
equilibrium of  the economic system. This endogenous determination of  prices creates no 
difficulties for proposition (Pl). All that is necessary is that individual agents take these 
prices as given and act in their own best interest. 
7. This difference might be due to the finite life of  individuals or to an excess of  the 
private cost of  risk over the social cost or to other factors. Somewhat less plausibly, it might 
be assumed that the private discount rate is less than the social discount rate. Obviously, this 
would require the exact reverse of  the policies appropriate to correct for an excess of  the 
private discount rate over the social discount rate. 
8.  TheA = +(K,  IAl)/rlineissteeperthantheA = q(K,  IAl,P)/rlinebecauseB(K,  1x1) 
>  for K <  I?  and A >  0. It follows that the speed of  convergence to the steady state under 
the optimally varying tariff along the A = A(K) line is greater than the speed of convergence 
to the steady state along the A  = x(K)  line constructed for a constant P = p. 
9. If  we  make the stronger assumption that the proportional  difference between the 
marginal cost of  imports, J’,  and the average cost of imports, JI(C- X), increase a,s imports 
increase,  we may conclude  that the  optimal ad  valorem tariff, ?(K)IP*(K,  IA(K)  I  ), 
declines as K rises toward i?.  However, neither of these assumptions is guaranteed by the 
standard properties of  the foreign offer function. If  the marginal cost of  imports tends 
toward a constant value as imports rise, both the optimum specific  tariff and the optimum ad 
valorem tariff may rise as K rises toward I?. The level of imports, however, should always 
decline as K  rises toward R,  and so should the domestic relative price of the import good. 
10.  Since the relative output price is changing along the adjustment path, there is some 
difficulty in defining the appropriate measure of the discount rate. The basic point remains, 
however, that the amount spent on consumption will depend on  wealth, not current income. 
Hence, if wealth is not changing significantly as the economy moves along the adjustment 
path, the position  of  the demand curve in the left-hand panel of  figure 4.5 will  remain 
approximately constant. 
11. For a general discussion of  the circumstances under which tariffs and quotas are and 
are not equivalent, see Bhagwati (1965), Falvey (1975, 1976), and Fishelson and Flatters 
(1975).  ., 
12. Even if the hypothesis of (P7) is not valid and the tariff T(K)  rises as  Krises to R,  it is 
still true that, for any K <  R,  the import quota Q  (R  ) results in lower imports and a higher 
domestic price of  X  than the  tariff ~(8).  Hence the  quota Q(R)  induces more rapid 
convergence to the steady state than the tariff ?(a),  starting from any KO  < K. 
13. For  a general analysis of  production subsidies, consumption taxes, factor market 
interventions, and other second-best policies, see Johnson (1960), (1965), Bhagwati and 
Ramaswami (1963), Bhagwati, Ramaswami, and Srinivasan (1969), andDornbusch (1971). 
14. The desirability of factor market interventions when an optimum tariff is ruled out is 
well established; see Bhagwati and Ramaswami (1963) and Bhagwati, Ramaswami, and 
Srinivasan (1969). 
15. A detailed analysis of  the short-run and long-run effects of relative price changes on 
factor incomes, under the assumption that the amount of labor used for capital movement is 
constant, is implied by the results given in Mussa (1974). 
16. If  no capital movement took place, owners of  capital employed in X  would gain 
permanently in terms of both goods. When the process of capital movement is complete, the 
long-run gains to all capital owners are larger than the gains that owners of capital in X 119  Government Policy and the Adjustment Process 
would enjoy if no capital movement took place. The  only possible cause of loss to owners of 
capital initially employed in Xis from the increase in the wage rate induced by the use of 
labor in capital movement. It is unlikely that this increase in the wage would be sufficiently 
large and endure sufficiently long for owners of capital initially employed in X to suffer a loss 
in terms of  present discounted value of rental income from an increase in P. 
17. The implications of  alternative assumptions about adjustment technology are also 
investigated in Mussa (1978). The concept of  the “Penrose function” is discussed in Uzawa 
(1968, 1969). 
18. If  marginal labor requirements  are constant,  then, as discussed in Mussa (1978), 
there will be only one output price ratio at which both final outputs will be produced in the 
steady state. 
19. There is an error in Mussa (1978) in that the discount factor used in defining kX  and 
pz does not take account of  the depreciation of  capital. 
20.  Formally, the effects of  an increase in P  on K_,  and K, may be determined by 
applying the standard technique of  comparative statics analysis to (76) and (77). Specifi- 
cally, from the properties of the two-sector model, it follows that since Xis  capital-intensive, 
an increase in P  reduces W*(P),  increases R*(P),  and increases both G(W*(P)IP)  and 
e,(W*  (P)).  From (76) and the fact that H“ > 0, it follows that the steady state capital 
stock, K = Kx  + K,,  must rise as a result of an increase in P; geometrically, in figure 4.6, 
the KK line shifts outward from the origin. The increase in ex and ez implies that the LL 
line, defined by equation (77), shifts toward the origin. The shifts of the KK  and LL lines 
imply that Kx  rises by more than the increase in K and that lCz  declines. Moreover, the 
changes in both Kx  and KZ  are larger than would occur if  the aggregate capital stock 
remained constant, as determined by shifting only the LL line in figure 4.6. 
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Comment  Alasdair Smith 
Michael Mussa’s paper strongly questions on efficiency grounds the de- 
sirability of  government intervention in the process by which resources 
are reallocated  intersectorally in response  to changing world  market 
conditions. The argument is a natural (though far from trivial) extension 
to an intertemporal context of  the well-known Bhagwati-Johnson-Ra- 
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maswami-Srinivasan  optimal policy rules. A crucial feature of the model 
is the assumption of  rational expectations. Although there are doubts 
that one could reasonably raise about this hypothesis, there are also very 
good reasons for this to be a benchmark hypothesis in any intertemporal 
policy model, and I do not question its validity here. 
Rather, my concern is whether a model in which income distributional 
issues are absent can do justice to the real-world motivations for trade- 
related adjustment assistance and to the consequent second-best issues. 
In at least some of  the literature on the second best there is a reason- 
able justification for policy choices being restricted. Tariffs, for example, 
may be chosen rather than subsidies to deal with domestic distortions 
because the direct cost to the government budget or the political cost may 
be less. It is not clear, however, why a government should be subject to 
the constraints which Mussa discusses: if, for example, it has the capabil- 
ity to calculate optimal tariffs and quotas, it surely has the capability to 
vary these restrictions over time. 
There are two important sets of  second-best issues touched on at the 
end of section 4.5, but because of the neglect of income distribution, they 
are dismissed as pure distortions. 
One possible motivation for giving trade adjustment assistance is simp- 
ly to provide compensation from the gainers to the losers from trade, in 
an attempt to reduce or eliminate political opposition to the efficient 
allocation of  resources. It is clear that in general such bribes cannot be 
paid in a nondistorting way, so we have the second-best problem of 
balancing the need for such payments against the desire for full efficiency. 
(Incidentally, it may be this aspect of  trade adjustment assistance which 
justifies benefits in excess of  ordinary unemployment benefits. When 
there are intranational shocks, there are strong producer lobbies within 
the country in favor of the change, so it is harder to assemble a coalition of 
losers who, unbribed, can stop change.) 
The second  aspect  of  trade  adjustment  assistance not  adequately 
treated by Mussa is the social insurance motivation. This may partly be 
for the entirely fortuitous reason that the three-factor model which is the 
natural framework of  analysis for this issue is normally presented with 
labor as the mobile factor and capital as sector-specific. Yet the real 
problems with adjustment to shocks surely arise for workers with sector- 
specific  skills, high moving costs, and so on. The capital market provides 
insurance for stockholders, who can choose the extent to which they face 
risks. Workers, by contrast, for reasons having to do with moral hazard 
and adverse selection, may not be able to obtain their desired amount of 
insurance against unemployment or dislocation. Even if riskier industries 
pay higher wages there remains the problem of  ex post equity: a wage 
which compensates for a 10 percent chance of becoming unemployed may 
not, after the event, be regarded as adequate compensation to the 10 122  Michael Mum 
percent who actually become unemployed. Again, we have interesting 
second-best questions: whether the points sketched above justify the 
existence of  a social insurance program, whether and how equity and 
efficiency come into conflict, and how such a conflict is optimally re- 
solved. 
So although the message of  this paper, that there are no obvious 
eflciency grounds for instituting trade adjustment assistance programs, 
may be thoroughly convincing, that message should not be misunder- 
stood. 
As a postscript, I offer an alternative explanation of the issue discussed 
at the  start of  section  4.5.  In  the pure  Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson 
model, taxes on  factor income are taxes on rents and so are nondistorting. 
In the present model, a tax on capital income is distortionary. Mussa says 
this is essentially because it has an effect like the effect of an income tax 
on saving. But there is no capital accumulation here. It may be more 
insightful to interpret the rent on the fixed capital stock as the lower of the 
two sectoral rates of return. The rate of return differential is a return to 
the elastically supplied activity of moving capital, so a tax on this is not a 
tax on rents. The “investment tax credit” proposed by Mussa is nondis- 
torting simply because it removes the tax on the rate of return differen- 
tial. 
It is also worth  pointing out that  the  “capital-moving’’ sector has 
decreasing returns but operates competitively, so rents are being accrued 
here  too.  I  conjecture  that  with  Mussa’s  “investment  tax  credit,” 
although only rents are taxed, not all rents are taxed, and that other 
nondistorting taxation schemes exist where the rents of the (fixed number 
of) capital-moving entrepreneurs as well as the rents of capital and labor 
are taxed. 